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The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) encompasses a Dispute Resolution System that is widely 
regarded as efficient: cases are resolved within a relatively short time frame and compliance with 
rulings has been high. The dispute resolution mechanism encompasses three phases: consultation, 
arbitration through a panel, and arbitration through an appellate body if a panel decision is 
appealed. While there exists an extensive body of literature exploring the determinants of 
settlement at the consultation stage of the WTO’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, I explore the 
determinants of settlement prior to the initiation of any sort of formal proceedings in a database of 
2,334 complaints filed at the USTR between 1995 and 2004. My outcome variable is a binary that 
represents the complaints filed with the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office (“USTR”), 
distinguishing between those that the USTR chooses to escalate into a WTO dispute and those it 
chooses to resolve through other means. My base specification is motivated by a simplified gravity 
model which I later augment to other variables of interest including a ‘continuity’ variable that 
codes for the nature of the good or service in dispute, and for a measure of the concentration of the 
trade barrier at hand. I also explore polity scores of the trading partner enacting the barrier. I find 
that the gravity model helps explain whether the USTR escalates a complaint into a dispute, and 
continuity, concentration, and polity all help increase the probability that the USTR escalates a 
complaint into a WTO dispute. My results affirm that the gravity model continues to hold 
explanatory power and point to the importance of the characteristics of the barrier itself in 







The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) encompasses a Dispute Resolution System that 
is widely regarded as efficient: cases are resolved in accordance with a clear protocol and within 
a relatively short time frame, and compliance with rulings is generally high. The WTO’s success 
as an efficient multilateral institution in its first two decades of existence have garnered 
legitimacy for the trade institution, and have invited numerous studies surrounding its complex 
dispute resolution mechanism. Notably, however, less research has been performed on the trade 
barriers that end up as the focus of this dispute resolution mechanism before they become WTO 
disputes. This paper seeks to shed more explanatory power on the attributes of complaints that 
the U.S. government chooses to pursue and escalate into WTO disputes.  
Though the gravity model has long been used to predict trade flows between two 
countries, I explore whether the model is able to explain the United States’ dispute propensity, 
and validate the notion that larger economies and those with a greater bilateral trade volume 
become involved in disputes disproportionately often. Specifically, I test whether the economic 
size and trade volume between the U.S. and its trading partners helps predict if the U.S. Trade 
Representative’s Office (USTR) will escalate a complaint into a WTO dispute. Prior literature 
suggests that the gravity model is efficient in predicting the amount of WTO disputes between 
two countries, but I test whether it successfully predicts the escalation of a complaint into a 
dispute, specifically in relation to the United States. To do so, I examine 2,334 complaints filed 
with the USTR between 1995 and 2004, 114 of which were escalated by the USTR into WTO 
disputes. If the gravity model proves to be significant in explaining dispute escalation, this 
confirms that economy size and trade volume are prime predictors of whether the USTR will 
escalate a complaint. 
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In combination with the classic gravity model, I also explore additional variables that 
theory suggests may help augment the original specification. I first test a novel variable that 
controls for the nature of the complaint in question. Namely, I manually code for a binary 
variable that distinguishes between complaints of a relatively continuous nature, as opposed to 
those that are non-continuous, and test whether it has an effect on whether the USTR escalates 
the case at hand. For example, cases surrounding import restrictions provide greater bargaining 
room than cases that have to with bans of certain goods based on a technical issue, because they 
have a larger set of possible solutions. In the case of import restrictions, both countries can 
advocate for their side and reach a middle ground, while a case surrounding a ban will have a 
clear winner and loser, no matter whether the ban gets lifted or remains in place. Hence, the first 
group of cases are relatively easier to settle and are considered “continuous.”  
Though the variable has previously been used to explain whether disputes settle in the 
first phase of WTO proceedings, it has not been used to explain dispute initiation. Resolving 
disputes outside of formal adjudication, i.e. reaching a settlement, is generally regarded as more 
efficient than judicial proceedings due to lower costs and favorable outcomes that are more likely 
to come with settlement. Apart from being less expensive and producing quicker results, 
settlement helps nations avoid all the legal complexities that come with formal judicial 
proceedings, and allows the details of proceedings to escape the public eye. Settlement theory 
predicts that continuous cases are more likely to settle outside of formal adjudication, due to the 
increased bargaining room that they provide. I therefore hypothesize that this remains the case 
when it comes to the trade barriers that formulate the complaints that have the potential to be 
escalated into WTO disputes. 
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I also explore whether the polity level of a trading partner, the concentration nature of a 
barrier (i.e. whether the barrier affects many countries or just the United States), and fixed year 
effects help explain which complaints the USTR chooses to escalate to the WTO. Theory 
suggests that more democratic states are likely to settle outside of formal adjudication. Further, 
studies have shown that the United States is more likely to challenge policies that are targeted 
specifically at the U.S., rather than at a vast number of countries.  
Though the gravity model is widespread in literature concerning trade and dispute 
resolution in the WTO, it has not yet been used to explain my variable of interest, i.e., what 
affects the USTR’s decision to escalate a complaint into a dispute. Further, the additional 
variables that I am interested in have the potential to create a unique augmented gravity model 
that has not been tested before. 
Background 
Established in 1995, the World Trade Organization is a relatively novel institution that 
emerged out of the earlier-established General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”). 
Despite its young age, the WTO’s impact on international law and general international relations 
has been transformative. In the last two decades, the organization has been able to improve trade 
by establishing clear rules of trade between nations and providing a channel for dispute 
resolution that aims for compliance, efficiency, and efficacy. In numerous cases, the WTO has 
achieved all three. However, through dispute resolution, the WTO has been found to favor larger 
members such as the United States and European Union, both, in terms of participation and in 
terms of outcome. Such is the case because these parties can afford the WTO’s extremely high 
litigation costs and fare better in handling the legal complexities of its dispute resolution system. 
Even then, as this paper explores, the United States only escalates a minority of complaints that it 
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receives into formal WTO disputes. 
Though disputes are filed by WTO members, i.e. countries, in the United States they are 
often escalations of complaints filed by domestic entities such as corporations. The United States 
has the legal capacity and economic might to pursue more disputes than most other WTO 
members, but only a fraction of the complaints filed with the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office 
actually turn into disputes. This paper seeks to provide a novel explanation for why these 
complaints are escalated, based on an augmented gravity model. 
History of Trade Institutions 
Trade, which refers to the exchange of goods and services, has been traced back to 
prehistoric times – arising alongside the development of human communication. For the purpose 
of this paper, I will be examining contemporary international trade relations and the institutions 
governing these relations throughout the 20th century. I will then explain the factors that created 
the need for the World Trade Organization and culminated in its eventual formation. 
 International trade generally flourished prior to World War I: despite a lack of 
multilateral cooperation or institutional oversight, countries enacted relatively low trade barriers 
which resulted in very little trade discrimination. World War I and the economic reconstruction 
that followed brought about protection that led to significant trade barriers and no mechanisms to 
reduce them, creating a global economy that stood in stark contrast to that of the pre-war era. 
Following the economically dismal interwar period and the war that ensued, countries looked at 
the end of World War II as a blank slate – a chance to finally put in place mechanisms through 
which the international community could come together and efficiently lower trade barriers. 
Motivated by the international economic failure that occurred during the interwar period, 
countries came together and signed the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. The international 
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treaty, signed by 44 countries, aimed to restore the international economy and provide it with 
stability. In effect, the Bretton Woods Agreement set up the modern rules and institutions that 
continue to govern the international political economy to this day. Among the institutions set up 
by Bretton Woods were the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.  
Following the Bretton Woods Agreement, in 1947, 23 countries agreed to what would 
become the predecessor to the World Trade Organization – the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT). This agreement was specifically meant to restrict protectionism and trade 
barriers in order to avoid future economic slowdowns. The signing of the GATT was indicative 
of the paradigm shift that had commenced at the time – a shift that stressed the importance and 
benefits of free trade as opposed to protectionism and, as a result, encouraged the eventual 
formation of regional trade agreements. In 1992, for example, the European Union eliminated its 
internal barriers to trade between its members, both in goods and in labor. In 1994, Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States also entered into a regional trade agreement known as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
As discussed by Douglas Irwin in “The GATT in Historical Perspective,” the GATT 
featured both, many achievements and many shortcomings. Its initial success was indisputable – 
the 23 countries that participated in its first round implemented tariff cuts and implemented those 
cuts on a Most-Favored Nation (MFN) basis, meaning they were non-discriminatory. 
Furthermore, countries agreed to lock-in these trade cuts, which proved crucial in helping 
prevent backsliding in terms of tariffs as other trade barriers arose in the coming decades. 
Despite this early success, the following 15 years saw progress in the GATT slow down 
significantly. Though GATT membership expanded, the institution “made only minor progress 
 
8 
in reducing tariffs” (Irwin 325). Members became frustrated at the GATT’s process. Particularly, 
the GATT lacked clear dispute resolution mechanisms, resulting in a backlog of cases that never 
got solved. This inefficiency, coupled with a lack of enforcement and, hence, compliance with 
rulings, led the GATT to lose most of its legitimacy as an institution. 
History of the WTO 
In 1994, the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement marked the completion of the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations, which resulted in the formation of the World Trade Organization. 
The WTO was meant to replace several parts of the GATT, focusing on “liberalizing agricultural 
trade, eliminating voluntary restraint agreements, and strengthening dispute settlement 
procedures” while preserving the GATT and its initial main purpose (Irwin 327). 
The WTO Dispute Resolution System’s legal basis is the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). The DSU outlines a very clear and streamlined process that involves three 
clear stages of solving a dispute: consultation, empanelment, and appellate hearings. Once a 
member country complains to the WTO, this serves as a formal request for consultations, which 
constitute the first stage of dispute resolution in the WTO and take up to 60 days. Attorneys on 
behalf of the Complainant and Respondent are forced to talk to each other to see if they can settle 
their differences by themselves or through mediation, even though these parties “may have 
already gone through extensive bilateral attempts to solve the problem” (Stanton 54). Notably, as 
a way to shield governments from domestic interests, consultations occur behind closed doors. It 
is also critical to note that the “settlement” sought through consultations in the first stage of the 
WTO dispute resolution process occurs in the context of formal adjudication. This is in contrast 
to a resolution that occurs prior to any sort of legal proceedings, which is the settlement that I am 
interested in exploring in this paper. 
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If a case is unable to be resolved through settlement or a mutually-agreed solution 
(MAS), i.e., consultations fail, the Complainant may initiate the appointment of a panel. It takes 
up to 45 days for this three-person panel to be appointed, and its members have to be approved 
by both parties. If they cannot agree, the WTO Director-General may be asked to appoint 
individuals onto the panel instead. Once formed, the dispute officially enters the second stage of 
dispute resolution. The panel takes an additional six months to gather evidence, hold meetings, 
listen to oral arguments, seek expert advice, draw conclusions and issue a report. The report 
contains a factual background, the panel’s findings and conclusions, and is normally adopted by 
the Dispute Settlement Body within 60 days. 
Parties then have the right to appeal a panel’s decision through the Appellate Body, a 
permanent seven-member body which is set up by the Dispute Settlement Body and broadly 
represents the range of WTO membership. Of this body, three judges are appointed to consider 
an individual appeal. Once they are appointed, the case moves into the third stage of dispute 
resolution, and the Appellate Body makes a decision based exclusively on issues of law. Appeals 
are usually handled within 60 to 90 days and, once adopted, are legally binding on the countries 
affected.  
The WTO is unique in that its dispute settlement system is completely decentralized, 
meaning there is no central body to police the organization’s members throughout and after the 
dispute resolution process. This precludes the organization from having enforcement or 
punishment power (other than authorization of retaliatory measures in cases of failure of 
compliance) over its technically binding legal rulings, known as “recommendations” (Busch et 
al. 4). That the WTO has been able to garner so much legitimacy and such high member 
participation without any enforcement power is notable. 
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Overall, the WTO has been regarded as a large success in comparison to its predecessor, 
the GATT. Though the WTO is far from perfect, its “sophisticated body of jurisprudence” has 
allowed cases to get solved in a relatively quick timeframe (Busch et al. 1). The institution’s 
legitimacy is further bolstered due to the fact that it is the only international legal body that, 
through the authorization of retaliatory measures, has any sort of enforcement discretion over 
binding commitments of so many states. Crucially, compliance with WTO rulings has also been 
relatively high as opposed to compliance within the GATT. Though decisions rendered through 
both institutions are not technically enforceable, non-compliance in the GATT was far more 
common, most often taking the form of Respondents not implementing rulings. In terms of 
inclusiveness, the WTO is certainly more equitable than the GATT, encouraging participation 
among far more developing countries.  
However, the institution still faces various lines of criticisms. The most important line of 
issues with the WTO, with regard to this paper, is that WTO dispute initiation is notoriously an 
expensive and convoluted process that even large and economically powerful players such as the 
United States may be wary of. As a result, only a minority of complaints are raised to the status 
of disputes. 
A Complaint’s Journey to the WTO in the United States 
 For the purposes of this paper, I detail how a complaint becomes a dispute, specifically in 
the United States. The U.S. Trade Representative’s Office (“USTR”) initiates disputes in the 
WTO on behalf of the United States under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The USTR is 
able to do so through two channels: either by complaint of an interested party, or on its own 
accord. Though private individuals and corporations do not have direct access to the WTO. they 
are able to file such complaints, which may later be escalated into disputes by the USTR. This is 
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a critical component of the dispute resolution system: in effect, it gives domestic entities in the 
United States a pathway to resolving an issue caused by the decisions of other countries.  
It is important to note that the United States keeps track of “allegedly WTO-illegal trade 
barriers reported to them by internationally active firms” (Yildirim et al. 39). This gives the 
USTR access to a list of complaints, any of which it may decide to escalate and bring to the 
WTO as a dispute. 
Literature Review 
Broadly, the literature relevant to this study tends to deal with the following topics: 
analysis of the explanatory model of the gravity model as it relates to trade and disputes within 
the World Trade Organization, how settlement theory has played into the World Trade 
Organization’s dispute resolution mechanism thus far, how the concentration of a trade barrier 
affects its likelihood of being challenge in the WTO, and how a nature’s polity level generally 
affects dispute initiation. Each of the subsections that follows provides justification for the key 
variables and mechanisms in my regressions.  
Trade Gravity Model 
The gravity trade model is based on an adaptation of Newton’s universal law of 
gravitation in physics, and is used to predict the amount of interaction between two places. As 
noted by a 1999 study, “since the latter half of the nineteenth century, it has been used to explain 
social flows, primarily migration” (Wall 1999). The classic gravity model of international trade 
was introduced by Jan Tinbergen in his 1962 paper titled “An Analysis of World Trade Flows.” 
By utilizing GDP to account for countries’ economic size in combination with distance between 
the countries, Tinbergen was able to show that economic size and the distance between two units 
were significant determinants of empirical bilateral trade flows. Specifically, he found that as 
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distance between two countries grows, trade tends to fall, much like the force of gravitation 
diminishes when two bodies are separated. Under the classic form of this model in log-linear 
form, using Yi and Yj to denote national incomes, and Dij to denote distance, trade between 
countries i and j can be expressed as:  
ln	𝑋!" = 𝛼 + 	𝛽 ln 𝑌! + 	𝛾 ln 𝑌" − 	𝛿 ln𝐷!" 
where 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 are positive constants. 
Tinbergen’s finding has since been shown to be extremely robust, and the model has been 
used in hundreds of research papers relating to trade, including those that have been used to 
shape trade policy. As discussed by Yotov et al. in their 2016 paper titled “ An Advanced Guide 
to Trade Policy Analysis: The Structural Gravity Model,” the model is advantageous in that it is 
very intuitive, is grounded in solid theoretical foundations, offers a realistic general equilibrium 
environment, a flexible structure, and has strong predictive power. In 1985, Jeffrey Bergstrand 
expanded on Tinbergen’s model in his paper “The gravity equation in international trade: Some 
microeconomic foundations and empirical evidence,” in which he found that price and exchange 
rate variables “have plausible and significant effects on aggregate trade flows.” This finding 
rejected the assumption of perfect international product substitutability, utilized by the classic 
gravity model of trade.  
Recent literature has attempted to augment the gravity model by modifying its variables 
to explain trade trends that the classic gravity model does not explain well. For example, In their 
1999 paper titled “Controlling for Heterogeneity in Gravity Models of Trade,” Cheng and Wall 
improved on the gravity’s model tendency to overestimate trade between low-volume traders and 
to underestimate trade between high-volume traders. In order to account for this tendency, Cheng 
and Wall relaxed the notion that all countries must share the same gravity constant (in log-linear 
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form, same intercept alpha). Instead, their fixed-effects method assumed that there are fixed 
factors in the relationships between all countries that make the gravity constant different for each 
trading pair. Through their new model, Cheng and Wall were able to control for new factors that 
are typically hard to quantify – such as consumer preferences, historical links, and cultural 
similarities – as they were now included in each trading pair’s gravity constant. Furthermore, the 
authors were able to improve on their ability to capture distance effects. The classic model 
utilized distance between two capital cities, which became problematic for countries like the 
United States, which has economic centers on both coasts of the relatively large country. These 
economic distance effects could now be captured in each country pair’s unique gravity constant. 
Other studies that aimed to augment the classic gravity model utilized GDP per capita instead of 
GDP, captured not only distance but contiguity and border effects, and incorporated common 
language and colonial links. 
As it relates to trade disputes, Horn et al. demonstrated in their 1999 paper “Is the use of 
the WTO dispute settlement system biased?” that larger economies have more opportunities to 
become involved in a trade conflict because their economies are usually more diversified and 
they have a larger range of industries. Greater economies such as the United States or Japan, for 
example, have a significantly larger range of industries than highly developed small economies 
such as Switzerland or New Zealand. As a result, in relation to exports, these larger economies 
will be more likely to encounter trade restrictions and initiate disputes. Conversely, given larger 
economies’ more diverse set of imports, they are more likely to encounter an import-restricting 
measure and raise a dispute. 
In their 2005 paper titled “Power plays and capacity constraints: The selection of 
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defendants in WTO disputes,” Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons further explore how the 
economic size of opposing parties affects countries’ decisions to get involved in trade disputes. 
Specifically, they find that larger economies are not only more likely to initiate disputes, as 
shown by Horn et al., they are also more likely to be targets of trade disputes. This is explained 
by their larger market sizes, which raise the economic stakes involved with every trade 
restriction, and incentivizes a country to take legal action against a larger economy. A decision in 
favor of the complainant in the case of such a decision and compliance with such a decision by 
the defendant garners more gains for the complainant.  
The gravity model’s explanatory power in relation to World Trade Organization litigation 
is explored by Thomas Sattler and Thomas Bernauer in their 2010 paper titled “Gravitation or 
discrimination? Determinants of litigation in the World Trade Organization.” Sattler and 
Bernauer test concerns that dispute resolution in the World Trade Organization was largely 
motivated by discriminatory factors such as small legal capacity. However, the authors find no 
evidence of such discriminatory practices in the WTO. Instead, their findings point to the 
significance of the gravity model in explaining dispute initiation.  
In order to answer their research question, namely whether WTO litigation is motivated 
by discriminatory or gravity factors, the authors utilize a dataset of all directed WTO member 
state dyads between 1995 and 2003. Their dependent variable measures how many trade disputes 
a country initiated in the WTO in a given year. Sattler and Bernauer determine two “Full 
Models,” both of which are enhanced Gravity Models. These models control for log(Trade), 
log(GDP A), log(GDP B), Power Asymmetry, Democracy A, and Democracy B, with the first 
model also controlling for the number of WTO delegates each country has, and the second model 
also controlling for log(GDP/Capita A), log(GDP/Capital B). Apart from WTO delegates in the 
 
15 
first model, all of the other variables are significant in explaining how many WTO disputes are 
initiated by each dyadic pair. 
Problematically, however, by utilizing trade as one of their independent variables, Sattler 
and Bernauer likely run into endogeneity problems. This is because trade and trade disputes are 
likely jointly determined. While country characteristics such as GDP and polity scores might 
arguably be thought of as exogenous and can help explain both trade and trade disputes between 
two countries, it is somewhat unsatisfactory to put trade on the right hand side alongside the 
variables that predict trade in a regression with complaint/dispute status on the left-hand side. 
Furthermore, by utilizing GDP and GDP-per-capita of both countries, as well as their Power 
Asymmetry (which the authors define as the absolute value of log(GDP Ratio)), Sattler and 
Bernauer run seemingly run into multicollinearity issues. GDP-per-capita is just GDP divided by 
population and GDP Ratio divides both GDPs by each other. Putting all three on the right-hand 
side of the regression means the three independent variables will be highly correlated with each 
other. Although the bundle of regressors may be significant, the standard errors are enlarged. It 
becomes difficult to interpret each coefficient in the regression separately, and small changes to 
the input data can lead to large changes in the parameter estimates. In order to avoid these issues 
in my own regressions, I use only log of distance in my specifications alongside log GDP (hence 
capturing the main components of a gravity trade equation) but I do not use the GDP-per-capita 
and ‘Power Asymmetry’ variables which, as just pointed out, are functions of partner log(GDP) 
already.  
Settlement Theory 
My continuity variable is backed up by settlement theory, which generally carries 
explanatory power when it comes to the initiation and resolution of disputes. Specifically, theory 
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dictates that the nature of disputes makes certain cases relatively easier and therefore more likely 
to settle, and certain cases harder and therefore harder to settle.  
Ronald Coase’s paper titled “The Problem of Social Cost,” is one of the pillars of 
settlement theory. As he pointed out, in a world free of information asymmetry and transaction 
costs, every single dispute will settle outside of formal adjudication – if settling a dispute leads to 
gains to trade then it will be in the parties’ interest to resolve those disputes and capture those 
gains. In the context of the WTO, for example, member countries would resolve disagreements 
over allegedly illegal trade barriers outside of the dispute resolution system to avoid the costs 
associated with formal adjudication. However, in the real world, bargains take time, energy, and 
are subject to various issues. One such issue, information asymmetry, occurs when the parties of 
a dispute have access to different amounts of information and are, hence, unable to clearly see 
the bargaining range they are facing. Either countries think their likelihood of winning is higher 
than it actually is, or they fear that they don’t stand a chance against their adversary. Another 
issue, transaction costs, refers more broadly to the costs associated with the parties involved in 
trying to find a settlement outcome that is suitable to both sides.  
Most research that attempts to explain dispute settlement in the WTO focuses on the idea 
that in a world with information asymmetry, states will typically fail to reach agreements through 
settlement. However, in their paper titled “To Settle or Empanel?,” Beth Simmons and Andrew 
Guzman offer a unique application of settlement theory to WTO disputes in that they explore 
transaction costs as the main reason behind a case’s likelihood of settlement.  
Specifically, Simmons and Guzman explore the explanatory power of the nature of a 
dispute when it comes to whether or not a case settles. In their paper, Guzman and Simmons 
classify discontinuous cases as “lumpy” and relatively continuous cases as “non-lumpy.” The 
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former group involves “all-or-nothing” cases (e.g. those concerning bans or health and safety 
regulations) for which there is relatively little bargaining space. For example, the two most likely 
outcomes in the case of a disputed ban are (1) lifting the ban, which is a win for the party 
disputing it and a loss for the party that instated the ban, or (2) keeping the ban, which is a win 
for the party that instated the ban and a loss for the party disputing the ban. In the case of an 
import quota, on the other hand, countries are able to negotiate a number that is acceptable to 
both sides, i.e., reach a middle ground. The latter group, therefore, includes goods that are more 
easily divisible, such as tariffs and quotas. The scholars hypothesize that when the subject matter 
is “lumpy,” i.e. non-continuous, the parties’ ability to reach an agreement through the use of 
transfers is restricted. Conversely, goods that are relatively continuous provide for a more 
expansive bargaining space, and as a result, result in a larger likelihood of settlement. The 
authors analyze data for all cases brought to the WTO from its inception until the end of 2000. 
Simmons and Guzman find support for their hypothesis, but only among democratic states. In 
other words, classic settlement theory seems to hold up: cases with more bargaining room are 
more likely to settle.  
The authors give three reasons behind the existence of such transaction costs in WTO 
disputes. First, in a settlement, the inclusion of concessions unrelated to the dispute at hand is 
harder to approve through parties’ domestic political institutions and as a result create a 
constraint. Second, in a settlement, the inclusion of concessions unrelated to the dispute at hand 
is unfavorable to the nation making the concession, as it will have to be extended to all members 
of the WTO under the MFN principle. Lastly, the use of cash, which is an easily divisible 
settlement device that technically makes every single dispute “continuous,” is extremely rare. As 
a result, these constraints point to the presence of significant transaction costs, which are 
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essential to study as a possible explanation for why some disputes are able to settle and others 
are not. 
Importantly, Guzman and Simmons focus on settlement of a dispute once a dispute has 
already been initiated. The “settlement” that formulates my dependent variable is resolving an 
alleged illegal trade barrier outside of the WTO dispute resolution system entirely, rather than 
escalating it into a dispute. It is also crucial to note that the Guzman-Simmons paper was written 
much earlier into the establishment of the WTO and hence featured a relatively small sample size 
of 216 disputes. 
A wide range of settlement literature provides additional explanations as to why some 
cases are successfully able to settle, while others are not. Leandra Lederman, for example, argues 
that cases go to trial because of a failure to establish a common bargaining range in which a 
surplus is created and divided among the two parties. This failure can be attributed to four 
reasons: (1) classic information asymmetry – the parties' estimates of the trial outcome are not 
identical (2) the parties do not have symmetric stakes in the litigation, (3) the parties are not risk-
neutral and (4) the parties engage in strategic behavior in negotiating the division of the costs 
they will save by not going to trial (Lederman). The second reason is especially applicable to the 
WTO, given that parties may differ in size and political system, and stand to lose or gain very 
different amounts economically and politically. The third reason also makes sense in the context 
of the WTO; it can be argued that states are risk-averse (at least in democracies) because 
governments are accountable to the people they represent.  
Though settlement is the preferred outcome, if it is not achieved, courts are essential in 
partaking in bargains and achieving the same efficient outcome that would be achieved in the 
ideal world that Coase theorized about. Empirically, however, cases are generally far more likely 
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to settle outside of judicial proceedings, pointing to the fact that there are high benefits of 
settlements and/or very high costs to adjudication. Trade-related complaints are in line with 
classical settlement theory, as most complaints fail to be escalated into WTO disputes. Once 
WTO disputes have been initiated, however, disputes settle at far lower rates than cases in 
domestic court systems.  
Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill explain general benefits to settlement through cost- 
reduction arguments, party-preference arguments, superior-outcome arguments, and superior 
general effects arguments. The cost-reduction arguments stress that settlement saves both, the 
parties and the courts, time, energy, and money. Party-preference arguments point to parties’ 
desire to avoid court, greater satisfaction among parties, and a better meeting of parties’ needs 
when a case is resolved through settlement. The third body of arguments, superior-outcome, 
states that settlement helps parties achieve the “golden mean” of all possible outcomes and leads 
to outcomes that rest on superior knowledge of the cases. Additionally, settlement allows parties 
to utilize a wider set of norms, encourages their inventiveness when it comes to finding a 
solution, leads to greater compliance, and changes the nature of participants’ general behavior. 
Lastly, the superior general effects arguments state that settlement is beneficial because it acts as 
a deterrent of future undesirable behavior, acts as a moral example and educator, encourages or 
discourages future claims, and sets precedents about legal standards for other parties. 
The cost-reduction arguments are easily applicable to complaints filed by corporations 
with their domestic governments against trade restrictions – settlement helps states avoid 
spending the money, time, and legal resources that formal adjudication, i.e., WTO dispute 
initiation, requires. Additionally, unlike outcomes achieved prior to or during settlement, reports 
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issued by formal panels are accessible by the public, and “litigants no longer enjoy insulation 
from domestic interests” (Busch et al.).  
Apart from examining the causes and benefits to settlement in general settlement 
literature, I also examine what factors specific to the WTO have been found to increase the 
likelihood of settlement. In “Settling WTO Disputes: What do Litigation Models Tell Us?,” 
Amelia Porges questions why the likelihood of settlement in the WTO’s dispute resolution 
system is so much lower than in that of domestic courts. Porges divides litigation and negotiation 
models into two categories: ones that are based on optimism of negotiation WTO members, and 
ones that are based on information asymmetry. She comes up with three explanations for why 
members of the WTO are less likely to settle: both sides are too optimistic, asymmetries of 
information are most possible at the time of settlement, or the defending party has insufficient 
incentives to “pay to make the case go away.” 
 In sum, settlement between two states in the WTO is less likely than traditional 
settlement between two individual parties because the two groups often have different levels of 
incentives, investment, and information in pursuing certain outcomes. These are all 
considerations that countries keep in mind not only once a WTO dispute has been initiated, but 
also when deciding whether or not to bring a dispute to the WTO in the first place. Porges’ 
examination of the complexities of the WTO dispute resolution system make it clear that though 
complaint and dispute settlement in the WTO can be explained by general settlement theory, it is 
also far more nuanced than settlement within domestic courts. 
Polity in Dispute Initiation 
 A partner nation’s polity score controls for how democratic it is in terms of an index that 
accounts for factors such as the competitiveness and openness of its elections, the nature of its 
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general political participation, and the level of limitations on the nation’s executive authority. 
The score can range from -10 to 10, with scores of 6 to 10 classified as democracies. Past 
literature has conjectured that a nation’s polity score, which I control for in my augmented 
gravity model, is positively related to dispute initiation. As explored by Todd Allee in his 2002 
paper titled “Legal Incentives and Domestic Rewards: The Selection of Trade Disputes for 
GATT/WTO Dispute Resolution,” the argument behind this is that “leaders of societies that hold 
strong beliefs in the rule of law and the desirability of allowing courts to resolve disputes” are 
more likely to then utilize these courts, as opposed to “resolving” these disputes through other 
means.  
Concentration of Trade Barriers 
 In my augmented model, I also explore whether the concentration of a trade barrier, 
namely, whether a barrier affects many WTO members or only a few, affects the likelihood of its 
escalation as a dispute in the WTO. For example, banning a good from a specific country is a 
barrier concentrated on that one specific country. On the other hand, something like subsidizing 
domestic companies that produce certain goods depress prices of that good worldwide, thereby 
affecting all countries that also produce this good. This is a prime example of a diffuse trade 
barrier. Previous theory suggests that a barrier that affects a small sample of WTO members, or 
the United States alone, are less likely to settle outside of formal adjudication. In their paper 
titled “Free-Riding on Enforcement in the WTO” written in 2016, Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. 
Pelc found that in cases of diffuse policies, many can benefit from litigation but no one country 
wants to take on the costs. In other words, collective action problems make it less likely that the 




This study has two primary goals. First, I explore whether the gravity model has 
explanatory power when used to analyze whether trade barriers enacted against the United States 
are pursued by the USTR and escalated into disputes. Second, I explore the extent to which novel 
variables such as the continuity of a complaint and the concentration of a barrier can add 
explanatory power to the gravity model. These hypotheses are all specific to explaining whether 
complaints filed by international firms are then brought to the WTO by the USTR as formal 
disputes. 
I hypothesize that the gravity model should help explain whether a complaint is escalated 
by the USTR into a dispute, or whether it is instead resolved outside of formal adjudication. Prior 
literature suggests that the gravity model helps explain the number of disputes that are initiated 
between pairs of countries within the WTO, and similarly, in line previous literature, I believe 
that it should hold explanatory power when determining whether the USTR disputes a barrier in 
the WTO. 
H1: Trade and the escalation of complaints to disputes should rise directly with GDP of the 
trading partner and inversely with distance between the U.S. and the trading partner. 
 
I hypothesize that the nature of a complaint has a direct effect on whether the complaint 
is brought to the WTO as a dispute by the USTR, or whether it is resolved outside of the WTO 
by other means. Past literature has shown this relationship to be significant, albeit early on in the 
existence of the World Trade Organization and in relation to disputes that have already been 
initiated. I believe that cases that are non-continuous and therefore harder to settle outside of 
formal adjudication, will have a higher chance of being brought to the WTO’s dispute resolution 
system. Furthermore, as explored by past literature, I believe that polity and barrier concentration 
also hold explanatory power in determining the escalation of a complaint into a dispute. 
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H2: Trade and the escalation of complaints to disputes should rise directly with the polity level 
of the trade partner enacting an allegedly illegal trade barrier, the concentration of the trade 
policy, and the continuity of the trade policy in question. 
Data 
The bulk of my data stems from a dataset originally compiled by Christina Davis in 2012, 
and later expanded by Professors Yildirim, Poletti, Chatagnier, and De Bievre in 2018. This 
dataset compiles all allegedly illegal trade barriers enacted against the United States by Canada, 
Mexico, the EU, Brazil, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, reported between 1995 
and 2012. The final dataset produced an unbalanced panel of 2,334 complaints, of which 5% 
became WTO disputes. Each observation enters the dataset in the first year that the allegedly 
illegal trade barrier is reported to the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office. My dependent variable 
is coded one if the US initiates a WTO dispute over the barrier following the enactment of the 
barrier, and zero otherwise. Additional characteristics that were most of interest to me for each 
complaint were the parties involved, trade volume between the US and the partner in each 
complaint, and the policy in question (i.e. why the barrier is allegedly illegal). 
In contrast to the dataset utilized by Sattler and Bernauer that included all dyadic pairs in 
the WTO but only one observation per dyadic pair and year, my dataset is limited to the USA 
and the nine trading partners listed above. However, my dataset contains multiple complaints per 
partner-pair and year, and my focus is the factors that determine the transition from complaint to 
WTO dispute. The dataset also includes only trade barriers reported by internationally active 
firms to the United States as complaints, possibly leaving out observations representing barriers 
enacted that were never reported. 
I merged this dataset with the Dynamic Gravity Dataset for 1948-2016, compiled by 
Tamara Gurevich and Peter Herman and released by the United States International Trade 
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Commission. This dataset seeks to provide core gravity-related characteristics for every country 
pair in every year between 1948 and 2016, including macroeconomic, cultural, and geographic 
indicators. From this dataset, I was most interested in obtaining GDP characteristics of the 
parties in the complaints in my original dataset, which I merged with my original dataset by 
partner name and year. I also utilized the distance and polity scores from the Dynamic Gravity 
Dataset.  
Finally, I also manually coded for the ‘continuity’ of each complaint. I modeled my 
coding based off of the work published by Simmons and Guzman. The authors published their 
coding for WTO cases that they analyzed prior to 2000, where they label disputes as either 
“continuous” or “non-continuous.” Disputes concerning import bans, technical regulations, and 
intellectual property, for example, leave little room to compromise and are considered “all-or-
nothing.” In my paper, therefore, I code them as non-continuous. Disputes concerning import 
quotas, quantitative restrictions, and anti-dumping duties, on the other hand, leave greater room 
for outcomes acceptable to both parties, and are coded as continuous. I summarize the theory 
behind this coding in my literature review.  
In order to create my binary independent variable, I followed the pattern used by 
Simmons and Guzman. I determined the continuity based on the policy in question of each 
complaint, which was reported in the Yildirim et al. dataset. Continuous cases were coded as one 
and non-continuous cases were coded as zero. Cases were only coded as continuous if they had 
to do with tariffs, nonzero quotas, import restrictions, and subsidies. Otherwise, I coded them as 
non-continuous. It is important to note that the original paper that coded for this variable had 
three people cross-checking each other’s work. In order to keep the variable as robust as 
possible, I utilized a strict rule system to code for it, as described above.  
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The following are some statistics summarizing the distribution of my key variables: 
according to the classification that I used, about 81% of complaints are considered non-
continuous, while 19% of complaints are considered continuous. In regard to my dependent 
variable, 95% of complaints do not end up becoming disputes, while 5% do. In absolute terms, 
out of 2,331 complaints in my dataset, 114 end up becoming disputes. 
As observed from the summary statistics below, the number of cases per year is rising, 
but the fraction of complaints that become WTO disputes is falling. This suggests that it is 





Summary Statistics Table 1 
 
  Complaints Continuity Concentration 
Avg. Polity 
Score   
Year 0 1 0 1 0 1 - Total 
              
1995 163 20 141 42 161 22 7.49 183 
1996 173 17 150 40 171 19 7.46 190 
1997 183 17 157 43 182 18 7.80 200 
1998 202 11 174 39 196 17 8.13 213 
1999 227 14 194 47 220 21 8.19 241 
2000 236 11 200 47 228 19 8.24 247 
2001 237 8 199 46 226 19 8.07 245 
2002 262 9 226 45 253 18 8.23 271 
2003 267 5 228 44 253 19 8.20 272 
2004 270 2 232 40 252 20 8.17 272 
                  







Summary Statistics Table 2 
 








2004   
Partner 0 1 0 1 0 1 - - - - Total 
                    
Brazil 195 8 179 24 198 5 8.00 8058 1.39E+12 1.72E+12 203 
Canada 194 19 161 52 201 12 10.00 2135 1.10E+12 1.48E+12 213 
EU 416 42 389 69 430 28 10.00 7596 1.20E+13 1.57E+13 458 
India 223 3 156 70 214 12 9.00 13163 6.04E+11 1.03E+12 226 
Japan 410 9 374 45 387 32 10.00 10229 5.06E+12 5.58E+12 419 
Korea 401 13 308 106 359 55 7.48 10,646 5.51E+11 8.61E+11 414 
Malaysia 162 0 129 33 140 22 3.00 14807 1.29E+11 1.94E+11 162 
Mexico 104 20 97 27 98 26 6.73 2493 6.87E+11 9.27E+11 124 
Singapore 115 0 108 7 115 0 -2.00 15101 1.02E+11 1.59E+11 115 
U.S.A. - - - - - - 10.00 - 1.03E+13 1.39E+13 - 
                    





Since my outcome variable is dichotomous, I employ a logit model across all of my 
specifications to model the probability of settlement.  
In the first set of regressions below, I model the relationships governed by a basic gravity 
model, where partner country GDP – or really the product of US GDP and partner country GDP 
– and product of distance determine the volume of trade and disputes.1 I also test an alternate 
specification of this gravity model, in which I replaced distance with trade, as did Sattler and 
 
1 In a classic version of the gravity equation, we have Yit = G*(GDP_usa_t)b1 *(GDP_partner_t)b2 / (distance)b3, 
which in log form yields a regression of the form:  
 
lnYit = b0 + b1 *lnGDP_usa_t + b2*lnGDP_partner_t - b3*lnDistance_i_t ,where b0 = lnG. However since 
b1*lnGDP_usa_t is constant across partner countries in year t, this will be observed in the year fixed effects. 
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Bernauer in their augmented gravity models. I tested both models with and without fixed year 
effects. 
In the next set of my regressions, I expand from this base specification to include my 
continuity variable in order to test whether it holds any explanatory power in determining 
whether a complaint is pursued by the USTR and is therefore escalated into a WTO dispute. I 
next augment my gravity model even further, by including polity and trade barrier concentration. 
I created two versions of each specification: one with fixed year effects and one without. 
Results 
Part I 
 The stripped-down gravity model proved to be significant in determining whether 
complaints were escalated into WTO disputes (Table 1, Column 1). As expected, the coefficient 
on log(Distance) was negative and the coefficient of log(GDP B) was positive. The further away 
a country is from the United States, the less the United States trades with that country, and the 
less likely the United States is to initiate a WTO dispute with that country. At the same time, the 
more economic power a trading partner holds, the more interest the United States has in trading 
with that country, and the more likely the United States is to initiate a WTO dispute with that 
country if it enacts trade policies which are unfavorable to the U.S. Signs and significance of the 
coefficients stayed consistent when I controlled for fixed year effects (Table 1, Column 2). 
Given that my specification is a logit model, in order to interpret the coefficients of my 
variables, I cannot look at their values directly but rather turn to their marginal effects. Marginal 
effects are beneficial in that they present results as differences in probabilities, which is more 
informative than odds ratios and relative risks. In other words, by looking at the margins, I can 
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tell what each specific variable’s effect is on increasing the likelihood of my dependent outcome 
(WTO dispute initiation), provided all other variables are kept at their means.  
 I first examine the marginal effects of my simple gravity model (Table 2, Column 1). 
Though distance in my dataset is measured in kilometers, because it is logged, its effects are 
discussed in percentage terms. Making the distance greater by one percent decreases the odds of 
escalation of a dispute by 5%, holding all other variables (i.e. GDP of the trading partner) at their 
means. This effect is statistically significant. On the other hand, increasing GDP B by one 
percent while holding log(Distance) at its mean. increases the likelihood of complaint escalation 
by 1%. This marginal effect is also statistically significant. The value and significance of the 
marginal effects stay the same when I control for fixed year effects (Table 2, Column 2). 
 When I ran the same model substituting log(Trade) for log(Distance), I found that though 
trade itself is significant in determining dispute initiation, log(GDP B) becomes insignificant 
(Table 1, Column 3). The sign and significance of the coefficients remain the same, when 
controlling for fixed year effects. This points to the notion that log(Distance) seems to better 
capture the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and its trading partners than log(Trade), since 
log(GDP B) and log(Distance) predict log(Trade) and elements that predict trade on the right-
hand side of my regression creates problems. This may further indicate the endogeneity problems 
embedded in utilizing trade to determine the likelihood of a WTO dispute.  
 In terms of marginal effects, trade has less of an effect than does distance in predicting 
the likelihood of WTO dispute initiation (Table 2, Column 3). Increasing the volume of trade 
between the U.S. and its trading partner by one percent increases the odds of escalation of a 
dispute by 3%, holding all other variables (i.e. GDP of the trading partner) at their means. This 
effect is statistically significant. On the other hand, increasing the log(GDP B) by one unit, i.e. 
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increasing GDP B by one percent, while holding log(Trade) at its mean increases the likelihood 
of complaint escalation by 0.4%. This marginal effect is not statistically significant, as isn’t the 
coefficient in the original regression. The value and significance of the marginal effects stay the 
same when I control for fixed year effects (Table 2, Column 4). 
Part II 
 I next augment my basic gravity specification to explore the hypotheses that other 
variables have potential explanatory power in predicting whether the USTR will escalate a 
complaint into a WTO dispute. 
The continuity variable proved to be significant in determining whether complaints were 
escalated into WTO disputes when added to my previous gravity model specification (Table 3, 
Column 1), increasing the likelihood of dispute initiation by 4%, according to its marginal effects 
(Table 4, Column 1). Paradoxically, the variable had a positive coefficient, pointing to the notion 
that cases that are continuous and theoretically less likely to be escalated into disputes, are 
actually more likely to be escalated by the USTR. The sign, significance, and marginal effects of 
log(Distance) and log(GDP B) remained the same as in the regressions in Part I. The addition of 
the continuity variable therefore points to the robustness of the previous gravity specification. 
The sign, significance, and marginal effects of all variables also stayed consistent when I 
controlled for fixed year effects (Table 3, Column 2 and Table 4, Column 2). 
With regard to the positive coefficient obtained on the “continuity” variables in Columns 
1-8 of Table 2, perhaps, the reverse story is happening. When cases are continuous and therefore 
easier to reach a compromise on, the USTR thinks the odds are heavily in its favor. The USTR 
may then think that it has a chance of obtaining even more favorable results (i.e. “winning) 
through formal adjudication than through any concessions obtained through settlement. It is 
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therefore more likely to escalate a complaint and initiate dispute proceedings within the WTO. 
This is in line with the “too optimistic” story told by Porges.  
Alternatively, in non-continuous cases, it is a lot harder for cases to find a “middle 
ground,” meaning any solution will likely have a clear winner and a clear loser. The only way for 
the USTR to “win” the case is if the outcome of its settlement or adjudication results in a 
complete reversal of the policy in question (e.g. a ban in question gets lifted). Given that this 
outcome is harder to achieve through settlement and adjudication alike (as opposed to a 
relatively smaller adjustment in policy), the USTR calculates that the risk and resources involved 
with initiating a dispute based on such a matter is not worth the potential rewards. Instead, the 
USTR decides to focus its resources elsewhere and avoids formal adjudication altogether. This is 
in line with Porges’ claim that asymmetries of information are heightened at time of settlement.  
Next, I augment my model by controlling for the polity score of the trading partner in 
each complaint. The coefficient on polity proves to be positive and significant at a 5% level 
(Table 3, Column 3), though this significance disappears when the specification controls for 
fixed year effects (Table 3, Column 4). This points to the notion that the United States is more 
likely to initiate a dispute with a more democratic trading partner, which is contrary to what 
theory may predict. One possible explanation for the signage of the polity coefficient is that the 
United States is more likely to share closer relations with its more democratic trading partners, 
and is more successfully able to resolve a complaint without resorting to dispute initiation in the 
WTO.  
In the specifications that control for polity (Table 4, Columns 3 and 4), the sign, 
significance, and marginal effects of log(Distance), log(GDP B), and continuity remained the 
same as in all earlier regressions. The marginal effects of polity reveal that the variable increases 
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the likelihood of WTO dispute initiation by 0.6% (significant), and this effect goes down to 0.4% 
(non-significant) when controlling for fixed year effects.  
My final variable of interest is the concentration of a barrier and whether it affects its 
likelihood of being escalated as a formal WTO dispute. I add it to my previous regression, and 
find that the variable has a positive coefficient, as expected, but is not significant at a 5% level 
(Table 3, Column 5). It’s p-value, however, reveals that the variable is significant at a 10% level. 
The coefficient of the variable remains positive and insignificant when the regression controls 
for fixed year effects (Table 3, Column 6). It’s p-value, however, reveals that the variable is 
significant at a 10% level. My regressions reveal that the United States is more likely to 
challenge barriers that affect solely the United States, as opposed to a multitude of countries, but 
at relatively lower significance levels.  
The marginal effects of all variables but concentration proved to be significant at this 
stage of the regression (Table 4, Column 5). The sign, significance, and marginal effect of these 
remaining variables remained consistent with earlier regressions, with and without controlling 
for fixed year effects. Notably, in the specification that controlled for fixed year effects (Table 4, 
Column 6), the marginal effects of concentration were significant at a 10% level, revealing that a 
case being concentrated increased its likelihood of being escalated into a dispute by 2%. 
When I ran the same model substituting log(Trade) for log(Distance), I found that the 
only significant variables in the specification were log(Trade) and continuity (Table 3, Column 
7). This result was consistent when controlling for fixed year effects (Table 3, Column 8). In 
terms of marginal effects, a one percent increase in trade between the U.S. and its trading 
partner, increased the likelihood of dispute initiation by 3%, with and without controlling for 
fixed effects (Table 4, Columns 7 and 8). The results once again point to the notion that 
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log(Distance) seems to better capture the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and its trading 
partners than log(Trade), even when the model is augmented with the previously discussed 
variables, because utilizing distance avoids probable endogeneity issues that utilizing trade 
causes.  
Notably, certain key results, such as the sign and significance of log(Distance), log(GDP 
B), and continuity proved to be robust to changes in specification, as did the sign and 
significance of the marginal effects of these variables. The augmented gravity model that utilizes 
log(Distance), continuity, concentration, polity, and controls for year fixed effects is my 
preferred specification. The model most closely incorporates the classic gravity model and 
includes variables of interest backed up by theory that are typically under-utilized but hold 
explanatory power in predicting WTO dispute initiation. 
Limitations 
Though my results are robust and largely in line with what theory predicts, they also face 
several limitations that are important to mention. First, it is difficult to capture in a simple 
empirical framework relationships that are complicated, nonlinear and simultaneous, such as the 
relationship between two countries and their propensity for dispute initiation. It is also hard, if 
not impossible, to ‘identify’ causal mechanisms in such a world as there are no obvious 
instrumental variables to identify simultaneous equation models. In making an effort to try to 
remove endogenous right-hand side variables, the regressions I estimated are reduced forms.  
It is also critical to note that this paper was specific to the United States and only nine of 
its WTO-member trading partners. Future research may expand on this paper by including all of 
the United States’ WTO-member trading partners, and by performing similar studies specific to 
other countries (e.g. the European Union). Furthermore, this paper assumes that if a complaint is 
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not escalated into a WTO dispute, it is resolved and/or settled through other channels, outside of 
formal adjudication. However, it may be the case that the USTR simply chooses to ignore some 
of the complaints that it receives and that from the companies’ perspectives, they never actually 
get “resolved.” Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, future studies can consider 
incorporating a two-stage model that explains how trade relationships first escalate into 
complaints and from there turn into WTO disputes.  
Conclusion 
My results reveal that a simple gravity model can be successfully used to predict whether 
the USTR will escalate a complaint filed by an international company into a dispute. The 
economic size of a trading partner and the distance between the partner and the United States 
points not only to a larger propensity for trade between the two, but also to a larger propensity 
for disputes. In other words, the larger and more diverse economies are, and the closer they are 
geographically, the more they will trade. With more trade comes a greater possibility of allegedly 
illegal trade barriers, and the United States becomes more likely to initiate a dispute in the WTO. 
It remains puzzling why polity’s coefficient is signed in the opposite direction of what 
theory would predict. A potential explanation for this is that the United States is likely to have 
closer relations to its trading partners that are more democratic, and is therefore able to resolve a 
complaint through negotiations that take place outside of formal adjudication.  
Similarly, continuity’s sign is contradictory to what theory suggests. This signifies that 
perhaps, the story behind settlement prior to dispute initiation in the WTO is different than what 
prior literature states. Alternatively, this finding suggests the potential of curvilinear data – a 
distribution in which cases that are very continuous (i.e., theoretically very easy to settle) and 
very non-continuous (i.e., theoretically very hard to settle) both settle. The first group of cases 
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contains an enormous amount of bargaining room for both parties and follows what classic 
settlement theory would predict, while the second group of cases is difficult to solve and likely to 
make the United States wary of the costs involved in pursuing the case. The “difficult” nature of 
these complaints therefore causes the USTR to avoid formal adjudication. The cases in the 
middle of the spectrum, therefore, are the ones that are likely to end up adjudicated through the 
WTO dispute resolution mechanism. 
The consistent signage and significance of the distance and GDP across various 
specifications points to the robustness of the variables under the gravity model. Distance also 
seems to be a better predictor than trade, which is what has been used in prior literature, but is an 
endogenous variable that may skew findings. Additionally, variables such as continuity, polity, 
and concentration successfully augment the gravity model, and add explanatory power to why 
certain complaints escalate into WTO disputes. These variables are relatively underutilized in 
studies exploring dispute initiation, but my results reveal that they hold explanatory power. My 
augmented specification is also unique in its balance of inclusion of characteristics of the parties 
involved in each potential dispute and the inclusion of characteristics specific to the complaint 
itself. 
As discussed above, future research may expand on this paper to include the United 
States’ trading partners beyond solely Canada, the EU, Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, Malaysia, 
India, Japan, and South Korea. Additionally, my preferred specifications may be tested from the 
perspective of other countries and their trading partners, as opposed to just from the perspective 
of the United States. Finally, future studies may explore a two-stage model that explains how 
trade relationships affect the filing of complaints, and how these complaints eventually turn into 
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Effect of Gravity Specification in Predicting WTO Dispute Initiation 
WTO_dispute (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
lndistance -1.108*** -1.110***    
  (-7.21) (-7.01)    
         
lntrade     0.651*** 0.754*** 
      (4.51) (4.85) 
         
lngdpother 0.328*** 0.362*** -0.0903 -0.101 
  (3.92) (4.26) (-0.93) (-1.03) 
         
_cons -2.547 -2.564 -21.52*** -23.60*** 
  (-1.11) (-1.10) (-6.27) (-6.33) 
         
Fixed Year Effects No Yes No Yes 
         
          
Observations 2334 2334 2334 2334 
 





Marginal Effects of Gravity Specification in Predicting WTO Dispute Initiation 
WTO_dispute (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
lndistance -0.0500*** -0.0486***    
  (-6.45) (-6.43)    
         
lntrade     0.0298*** 0.0336*** 
      (4.28) (4.61) 
         
lngdpother 0.0148*** 0.0158*** -0.00413 -0.00451 
  (3.76) (4.09) (-0.93) (-1.03) 
         
Fixed Year Effects No Yes No Yes 
          
Observations 2334 2334 2334 2334 
 






Effect of Augmented Gravity Specification in Predicting WTO Dispute Initiation 
WTO_dispute (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                 
lndistance 1.086*** 1.108*** 1.249*** 1.209*** 1.238*** 1.211***    
  (-7.05) (-6.98) (-7.14) (-6.91) (-7.07) (-6.91)    
                 
lntrade             0.617*** 0.719*** 
              (4.15) (4.44) 
                 
lngdpother 0.356*** 0.384*** 0.541*** 0.512*** 0.544*** 0.513*** -0.0535 -0.0994 
  (4.22) (4.50) (4.43) (4.16) (4.43) (4.13) (-0.46) (-0.85) 
                 
continuity 0.840*** 0.809*** 0.886*** 0.844*** 0.734** 0.691** 0.734** 0.663** 
  (3.92) (3.72) (4.11) (3.86) (3.09) (2.90) (3.12) (2.81) 
                 
polity_o     -0.153* -0.104 -0.147* -0.0963 0.0150 0.0329 
      (-2.21) (-1.48) (-2.08) (-1.34) (0.23) (0.49) 
                 
concentrated         0.523 0.557 0.494 0.475 
          (1.73) (1.84) (1.66) (1.59) 
                 





  (-1.60) (-1.46) (-2.39) (-1.97) (-2.46) (-2.01) (-5.11) (-4.89) 
                  
Fixed Year Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
                  
Observations 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 
 










Standard errors in parentheses ="* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001" 
  
WTO_dispute (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                 
lndistance 0.0484*** 0.0479*** 0.0556*** 0.0523*** 0.0549*** 0.0522***    
  (-6.38) (-6.45) (-6.44) (-6.40) (-6.41) (-6.40)    
                 
lntrade             0.0279*** 0.0316*** 
              (3.98) (4.26) 
                 
lngdpother 0.0159*** 0.0166*** 0.0241*** 0.0221*** 0.0241*** 0.0221*** -0.00242 -0.00437 
  (4.04) (4.32) (4.23) (4.02) (4.23) (4.00) (-0.46) (-0.85) 
                 
continuity 0.0375*** 0.0350*** 0.0394*** 0.0365*** 0.0326** 0.0298** 0.0332** 0.0291** 
  (3.82) (3.66) (3.99) (3.78) (3.04) (2.87) (3.06) (2.77) 
                 
polity_o     -0.00682* -0.00451 -0.00651* -0.00415 0.000677 0.00145 
      (-2.19) (-1.47) (-2.06) (-1.34) (0.23) (0.49) 
                 
concentrated         0.0232 0.0240 0.0224 0.0209 
          (1.72) (1.83) (1.65) (1.59) 
                 
Fixed Year 
Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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